CAAF granted review in two cases yesterday. The first involves an issue specified by the court:
No. 15-0087/MC. U.S. v. Carlton Wilder, Jr. CCA 201400118. On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals, it is ordered that said petition is hereby granted on the following issue specified by the Court:
WHETHER THE PROMULGATION OF RCM 707 ABROGATED THE “SUBSTANTIAL INFORMATION” RULE ORIGINATED IN UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON, 23 C.M.A. 91, 48 C.M.R. 599 (1974).
Briefs will be filed under Rule 25.
I discussed the CCA’s opinion in this post. The substantial information rule from Johnson addressed the presumption of an Article 10 speedy trial violation established in United States v. Burton, 44 C.M.R. 166 (1971), for pretrial confinement in excess of 90 days. But when an accused was confined for some offenses, and then additional offenses were discovered, the 90-day clock for the additional offenses began when “the Government had in its possession substantial information on which to base the preference of charges.” Johnson, 48 C.M.R. at 601. President Reagan promulgated R.C.M. 707 in 1984 (with a 90-day clock), and President Bush modified the rule to the current 120-day standard in 1991. Burton was then overruled in United States v. Kossman, 38 M.J. 258, 261 (C.M.A. 1993).
In Wilder, the NMCCA held that “Kossman voids the Johnson rule as well,” and that “R.C.M. 707(a)(1) establishes the commencement of the speedy trial clock for the additional charges as the dates of preferral.” Wilder, slip op. at 6. Notably, the AFCCA reached a similar conclusion in United States v. Proctor, 58 M.J. 792, 797 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App 2003). But cf. United States v. Bray, 52 M.J. 659, 661 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2000) (“We hold that, when an accused is placed in pretrial confinement as a result of a particular incident, the speedy-trial clock begins to run for all offenses that the prosecution knows, or reasonably should know, were part of that incident.”). However, the Coast Guard held otherwise – and applied the substantial information standard – in United States v. Cooley, No. 1389 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 24, 2014), cert. for rev. filed, __ M.J. __ (Feb. 23, 2015) (discussed here). And the Army court applied the substantial information standard in United States v. Boden, 21 M.J. 916, 917-18 (A.C.M.R. 1986).
Because of this, I think Wilder is a great candidate for amicus filings from the Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard appellate divisions.
The second grant from yesterday involves a lesser included offense issue:
No. 15-0334/MC. U.S. v. Quantaus R. Riggins. CCA 201400046. On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals, it is ordered that said petition is hereby granted on the following issue:
WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECIDING A QUESTION OF LAW WHICH HAS NOT BEEN, BUT SHOULD BE, SETTLED BY THIS COURT WHEN IT HELD THAT ASSAULT CONSUMMATED BY BATTERY WAS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE TO ABUSIVE SEXUAL CONTACT AND SEXUAL ASSAULT.
Briefs will be filed under Rule 25.
The CCA’s opinion is available here.